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 Objective: The purpose is to establish the relationship between the 
analysts’ stock valuation, the reporting environment and the stock 
recommendations. And to investigate the process of incorporating both 
quantitative and qualitative information into their forecasts. 
Methodology: The research will be archival, obtaining historical 
information from DataStream, Stock Exchanges and MSCI. A survey will 
also be carried out to corroborate findings, as the analysts’ valuation 
process may not be obtained through desk research. 
Results: The results are expected to show evidence for the incentive 
conflicts of the analysts’ decisions with regards to the peculiarities of the 
macroeconomic environments under consideration. 
Implication: The write up has implications for sell-side analysts where 
they have perceived incentive conflicts when they make 
recommendations. The research contributes to the argument on the 
conflicts of interest analysts face in forecasting earnings and making 
recommendations within the markets peculiar environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial analysts play a very important role in generating, processing and disseminating corporate 
financial information to investors. Their activities include among others; corporate data collection, 
forecasts earnings, stock valuation and stock recommendations. However, studies have shown that 
financial analysts are imperfect intermediaries, in part because of incentive conflicts with biased 
earnings forecast reports and recommendations (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Friesen and Weller (2006) attempted to quantify the analyst’ biases in earnings forecasts. Their 
model present evidence of analysts’ overconfidence on the accuracy of their own information. They 
show that these biases exist, in their data.  
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These conflicts of interest within the context of the analysts’ market environment tend to influence their 
decisions.  
The analyst’ decision does not hinge solely on the valuation of forecast earnings. The process begins 
with incorporating all publicly known information both quantitative and qualitative as contained in the 
company’s accounts and reports such as economic and industry outlook, quality of management, 
business connections, competitive advantage, strategies, and financial indices. It is on this basis that 
analysts make their decisions. Since their decisions to public disclosure are not regulated, analysts tend 
to have conflicts of interest.  It is pertinent to note that financial analysts as economic agents have their 
own incentives, similar to managers of companies. These incentives can affect the relevance and 
reliability of information that investors acquire from the analysts. In addition, research has shown that 
analysts’ bias recommendations will diminish  with the establishment of financial regulation (Barniv, 
Hope, Myring, & Thomas, 2009; Chen & Chen, 2009). 
Some academic research have been conducted on financial analysts’ activities in the capital markets, 
with focus on developed markets. Analysts in these markets perused, and based their conclusions on 
quantitative earnings forecast (Lustgarten & Tang, 2008; Mest & Plummer, 2000; Stickel, 1990; Wong 
& Zhang, 2014), financial regulations (Bradshaw, 2009),  the All Share Index and market capitalisation 
(Boissin & Sentis, 2012; Karamanou, 2012).  Sufficient attention has not been given to the financial 
analysts’ information processing role in the emerging and frontier markets. This is evident with the 
studies carried out (e.g. Corredor, Ferrer, & Santamaria, 2014; Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006) in G7 countries 
and European countries respectively. But the increase in financial deregulations, globalisation of capital 
markets, cross-border listings, economic growth and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) around the 
world, underscores the need to also study the emerging and frontier markets is. Also, Bradshaw (2009) 
asserts that researchers are keenly interested in the valuation process that leads to stock 
recommendations, but which unfortunately is not easily penetrated using empirical archival research, 
especially from financial reports.  
 
In recent years, the concern for transparent and credible financial reporting as a necessary means 
designed to enhance information flow and resource allocation in the capital markets cannot be over 
emphasized. An important goal of financial reporting is to bridge the gap between and among the market 
participants. However, financial accounting and reporting itself does not completely resolve this 
information problem. The information asymmetry that exists between company managers and investors 
(shareholders) makes equity analysts’ financial intermediation necessary. In their study, Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) found that firms followed by many financial analysts tend to lead 
those with fewer financial analysts in responding to new market information. This was consistent with 
the findings of Chuang and Lee (2011) that firms followed by fewer analysts tend to react to market-
wide information more sluggishly than firms followed by more analysts.  
 
Of recent, financial scandals and capital market crashes around the world shows the necessity for 
corporate financial transparency in order to regain investors’ trust. Companies that fail to communicate 
clearly to investors are likely to face difficulty in raising more finance. The professional analyst is 
expected to be fair in interpreting and communicating the necessary information to the investors 
objectively without prejudice.  However, financial analysts face incentive conflicts sometimes leading to 
bias reports and stock recommendations. This poses concern as to whether reliance could be placed on 
the accounting valuation process that led to such reports. The research aims to assess the importance of 
financial analyst as information intermediary in the equity market. The main purpose is to establish the 
relationship between analysts’ valuation, earnings forecast and stock recommendations. To achieve this, 
the study investigates the nature of the disaggregated information that is most important to analysts in 
their earnings forecast. It explores the regulatory and institutional factors that account for the differences 
in analysts’ role and their forecast properties across markets. The study also examines how financial 
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analysts’ incentive conflict affect the reliability and relevance of information they supply to investors 
and to establish whether analysts rely on accounting-based valuations models in making earnings 
forecasts and recommendations.  
Prior studies in this area focused mainly on the developed markets. With global financial contagion 
around the world, emerging and frontier markets peculiarity sometimes viewed as investors haven 
becomes of interest. This research has potential to contribute knowledge and to build on previous 
studies. For example, Karamanou (2012) suggested that future research should examine the link between 
the financial analysts and other market variables, in both emerging and the frontier markets.  However, 
the study will go further to examine analysts’ role in the frontier markets. The research will also 
contribute by extending the models, methods and analysis tools that were used in previous studies. 
Credible and transparent financial reporting is essential for efficient resource allocation in the capital 
markets. Financial reporting should reduce the information asymmetry that exist between managers and 
outside stakeholders. The financial analysts do not only play a complementary intermediation role to 
reduce this information gap, but expected to exhibit independence and objectivity devoid of incentive 
conflicts in their reports and recommendations. The recent global financial crisis reflects the relevance 
of an efficient capital markets and the important consequences that market frictions could have on the 
society. The series of financial reporting scandals around the world has major consequences for 
company employees - jobs and pensions, and financial markets. It is equally significant not to quickly 
forget the events which led to introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These 
events further highlight the necessity for high quality financial intermediation. Financial analysts are 
important intermediaries that are generally expected to have superior information processing skills. 
However, because financial analysts tend to have incentives to provide inaccurate and bias information 
to outsiders in order to impress company management, it is still arguable whether analysts actually add 
value to the society.  
The paper follows with literature review in section 2, followed by the proposed method in section 3. The 
write up finishes with a conclusion. 
2.  Literature review  
 
2.1 Conceptual framework  
2.1.1 Stock recommendations 
Stock recommendations represents analysts’ opinion to investors whether to buy, sell or hold a given 
stock. They are the main information source for equity investors based on their stock coverage. The 
recommendations are associated with significant reactions in stock prices, and the macroeconomic 
conditions. As market intermediaries, the analysts collect, examine, analyse and divulge valuable advice 
to investors. Such advice compares the present and expected market valuation of a given stock which 
translate into recommendation. In their study, Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2013) found that positive 
(negative) excess returns which follows recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are stronger when 
accompanied by daily volatility index decreases (increases). These behavioural pattern of the analysts is 
most likely not going to yield itself to investors track. 
        
Empirical findings show that financial analysts play important role in the capital markets. Healy and 
Palepu  (2001)  asserted that financial analysts in the capital market play a valuable role in improving 
market efficiency. They depend on information they collect whether from private or public source, and 
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on that basis evaluate companies’ performance. They then make earnings forecast and give 
recommendations to investors. This is evidence that analysts add value to the capital markets. 
2.1.2 Financial analysts’ decision process 
Analysts’ research bridges the information asymmetry and aid prices reflect information on security’s 
fundamentals. Their private incentives however, potentially contribute to misguided findings, with 
possible market fixation on such optimism of misleading reports. Farooq (2013) argued that lack of 
proper disclosure makes it difficult for analysts to gauge firms’ true value. Consequently, they rely on 
private information source about firm in order to make informative predictions as well as 
recommendations. 
        
According to Bradshaw (2009), researchers are keenly interested in the valuation process that leads to 
stock recommendations, but which unfortunately is not easily penetrated using empirical archival 
research. The study found a strong evidence that the analysts’ personal conflicts of interest has less 
impact on the association between their forecasts and stock recommendations. In their survey on 
analysts’ decision processes, Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) pointed out that analysts’ earnings 
forecasts depend mostly on disaggregated and qualitative information. The two most frequently used 
sources of information, other than reported earnings are management communication and segment 
reporting.  
2.1.3 Human information processing 
There has been increasing interest in behavioural decision making or human information processing. In 
their study, Libby and Lewis (1982) examined some research that exposes humans as poor intuitive 
statisticians. They asserted that this has subsequently accelerated the application of statistical sampling 
and regression analysis in auditing, and other decision aids developed to overcome common heuristics. 
They evaluated accounting research conducted using the lens model, predecisional behaviour, 
probabilistic judgment, and cognitive style approaches. This behavioural intuition in human is argued to 
play a significant role on the final outcome of the process. 
2.1.4 Analysts’ incentive conflicts 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001) although there is evidence that financial analysts produce 
valuable new information through their earnings forecasts reports and stock recommendations, there are 
yet systematic biases in financial analysts’ outputs, seemingly arising from the incentive conflict that 
they face. This was buttress by Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) that analysts do have incentives in 
making positive forecasts and recommendations when their brokerage firm is hired to underwrite a new 
securities issue. Information asymmetry and incentive conflicts impede efficient resource allocation in a 
capital market economy. The institutions that are established to facilitate credibility in disclosure 
requirement by managers play important role in mitigating the problems. Analysts forecasting research 
has evolved considerably since the early work documenting what appeared to be a bias toward optimism 
in forecasts and recommendations (Ramnath et al., 2008).  Ramnath et al., (2008) stressed that 
“incentives related to the career concerns of analysts, the underwriting and trading incentives of their 
employers, and how the incentives of, and communication with the company management influence 
analyst behaviour.”  Francis (1997) identified three types of bias that could affect analysts’ forecasts 
optimism: First is selection bias where analysts report and recommend only favourable views about 
stock performance but keep silent when it is unfavourable. The second is reporting bias where analysts 
deliberately report some positive amount in order to foster their relationship with management and to 
generate brokerage. The last is cognitive bias, where analysts inadequately process the available 
information. This incentive conflict ultimately influences the analyst’s decision. 
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2.1.5 Valuation models 
Research findings by Barth and Hutton (2004) indicates that whereas analysts incorporate information 
identifying firms with low persistent accrual, on revised results into their earnings forecast, investors 
however do not incorporate this information into their valuation assessment. In another study, Ramnath 
et al., (2008) asserted that it is a herculean task to discover the valuation model and important 
information that determines equity stock prices. However, in an efficient market analyst forecasts will 
immediately reflect all disclosed information. De Franco, Vasvari and Wittenberg-Moerman  (2009) 
stated that the bond market is of higher sophistication level relative to the equity market. The presence 
of rating agencies provides independent and objective information which aid to determine prices of fixed 
income securities. This suggests bond analysts will add less bias to their reports and recommendations 
than do equity analysts. 
Demirakos, Strong, and Walker, (2010) investigated the choice of valuation model by equity investment 
analysts to know whether the model affects the accuracy of their target prices forecast. In their findings, 
the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) models outperformed Price-Earnings (PE) models. Consistent with 
this findings, Imam, Barker, and Clubb (2008) examined the valuation models used by investment 
analysts in the UK. They observed that: 
“Analysts perceive the DCF which is somewhat sophisticated, to be significantly more important 
than prior survey evidence suggests, although we also find the continued importance of 
‘unsophisticated’ valuation multiples, notably the price/earnings ratio” (p.503). 
They found that, even though the DCF model is ostensibly credible, it is rarely relied upon in 
determining target prices and investment recommendations. It requires an understanding of the socio-
economic context and motivations in addition to the valuation models. 
         
Earnings forecasts which are futuristic tend to be more accurate than the historical time-series earnings 
models. This is likely because they incorporate company news immediately into their forecasts than 
time-series earnings models. The question now is, what are the valuation models equity analysts employ 
in the emerging and frontier markets?      
2.1.6 Agency problem 
According to Beyer et al., (2010) “the corporate information environment evolves endogenously as a 
result of information asymmetries and agency problems between managers, entrepreneurs, and 
investors” (p.296). They concluded that, “to date, little is known about the association between firms’ 
mandatory disclosure requirements, voluntary disclosure policies, and the information produced by 
equity analysts” (Beyer et al., 2010, p. 335). In another study, Armstrong, Guay and Weber (2010) 
reviewed the role of transparency in financial reporting and how it reduces governance-related agency 
conflicts among the stakeholders. The financial analysts also as economic agents face this agency 
conflict especially when their firms act as underwriters to their client.  
2.1.7 Analysts’ information environment  
According to Yin and Zhang  (2014) little is documented in the literatures concerning the financial 
analysts’ environment and its effect on their decision. Beyer et al. (2010) reviewed the decisions that 
influence corporate information environment in the stock markets as: mandatory regulatory disclosure, 
voluntary disclosure and analysts reporting decisions. Other current macroeconomic news and variables 
and analysts’ professional expertise are areas of influence to their decisions. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
Ball and Brown (1968) concluded that the income number of a firm for a given year captures a half or 
more of all the information made available for that year. This statement has implication for the efficient-
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market hypothesis. They also observed that the process of measuring the value of information about 
income and its statistical nature is little understood. This process of assumed value of the qualitative 
information that forms part of the analysts forecast basis is of keen interest.  
        
The financial analysts’ intermediation role is expected to complement in reducing the information 
asymmetry which ultimately reflects on stock prices. The agency theory comes to relevance in this 
aspect. Also, the analysts sometime act as both agent of the management as well as that of the investor. 
According to Bradshaw (2009) the analyst’s information processing role on which he forecast earnings 
and generate stock recommendations is of implicit interest. These variables need to be explored within 
the information environment of both the emerging and frontier markets. 
 
The information environment could be facing differing characteristics of regulations. Bradshaw (2009) 
supported the fact that when analysts’ activities are regulated, there would be positive effect on the 
decision usefulness of their recommendations. Where there are several overlapping regulations, it would 
be uncertain whether which specific regulation at a point limits the analysts’ conflict of interest. In the 
emerging and frontier markets, regulations might be influenced by infrastructural and macroeconomic 
conditions. Consistent with the findings of Barniv et al. (2009) and Chen and Chen (2009), tighter 
regulatory changes alters the characteristics of analysts’ activities, and can be observed before and after 
the regulations were introduced. 
3. Method 
The research methodology will be both archival and survey study, that is, historical data will be obtained 
from I/B/E/S earnings forecast through DataStream, MSCI Index, and Stock Exchanges, on which 
statistical analysis will be carried out using Stata application. A survey of financial analysts’ valuation 
process that lead to their stock recommendation will be carried out. The study covers the emerging and 
frontier equity markets as extension from previous research on the developed markets. Data source from 
previous research such as I/B/E/S, MSCI, and DataStream will be explored in order to benchmark the 
research outcome with that of the developed economies. Data will be collected for two countries; one in 
the emerging market, the other from the frontier market. Non-probability purposive sampling of 
financial analysts, stockbrokers and investment advisors. We shall use DataStream to obtain analysts 
earning forecast reports from I/B/E/S database. The panel data will be analysed using Stata statistical 
analysis application. The extent to which findings could be generalized to all emerging and frontier 
market countries around the world is limited to the countries under study, as they may not be a sufficient 
representation of the whole markets. The research is also subject to all the limitations recognized in data 
collection. 
4. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the study seeks to investigate the nature of the disaggregated information and valuation 
process the analysts use to make recommendations. It aims to establish the link between these four 
variables, namely; analyst’s earnings forecast, reporting environment, valuation incentives and stock 
recommendations. Prior works indicate that valuation multiples such as DCF and PE models were used 
by analyst as basis of their decisions (Demirakos et al., 2010; Imam et al., 2008). But less sufficient 
evidence on the impact of the analysts reporting environment has been documented (Yin & Zhang, 
2014). Therefore, the research will contribute to the debate on analyst’s bias in forecasting earnings and 
the incentives of making a particular recommendation within the context of the reporting environment. 
Although the analyst’s incentives are not easily verified through archival means, survey will however be 
carried out in order to determine the extent bias. 
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